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ESTIMATING RESTRICTED MEAN JOB TENURES IN
SEMI-COMPETING RISK DATA COMPENSATING VICTIMS
OF DISCRIMINATION
By Qing Pan and Joseph L. Gastwirth
George Washington University
When plaintiffs prevail in a discrimination case, a major compo-
nent of the calculation of economic loss is the length of time they
would have been in the higher position had they been treated fairly
during the period in which the employer practiced discrimination.
This problem is complicated by the fact that one’s eligibility for pro-
motion is subject to termination by retirement and both the promo-
tion and retirement processes may be affected by discriminatory prac-
tices. This semi-competing risk setup is decomposed into a retirement
process and a promotion process among the employees. Predictions
for the purpose of compensation are made by utilizing the expected
promotion and retirement probabilities of similarly qualified mem-
bers of the nondiscriminated group. The restricted mean durations
of three periods are estimated—the time an employee would be at
the lower position, at the higher level and in retirement. The asymp-
totic properties of the estimators are presented and examined through
simulation studies. The proposed restricted mean job duration esti-
mators are shown to be robust in the presence of an independent
frailty term. Data from the reverse discrimination case, Alexander v.
Milwaukee, where White-male lieutenants were discriminated in pro-
motion to captain are reanalyzed. While the appellate court upheld
liability, it reversed the original damage calculations, which heavily
depended on the time a plaintiff would have been in each position.
The results obtained by the proposed method are compared to those
made at the first trial. Substantial differences in both directions are
observed.
1. Introduction. When plaintiffs prevail in a case involving hiring or
promotion discrimination, courts need to estimate the economic loss (com-
pensatory damages) they suffered. The problem arose in the reverse discrim-
ination case Alexander v. Milwaukee (474 F. 3d 437, 7th Cir. 2007). The City
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of Milwaukee and its Board of Fireman and Police Commissioners were sued
by seventeen Caucasian male members of the Police department for discrim-
ination with respect to promotions from lieutenant to captain made during
the seven years of Chief Jones’ tenure. At the trial, the jury found the defen-
dants guilty of discrimination and ordered compensatory damages for each
plaintiff. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judge-
ment with respect to liability, but reversed the amount of damages awarded
and remanded the case for recalculation using more accurate estimates of the
plaintiffs’ “lost chances.” When there are more candidates than positions at
the time one or several openings are available, the economic damages need
to reflect the diminished probability of promotion that each plaintiff lost
(Bishop v. Gainer, 272 F.3d 1009, 1015-16, 7th Cir. 2001; Doll v. Brown, 75
F.3d 1200, 1205-07, 1996; Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 5
F.3d 186, 189, 6th Cir. 1993). Lost chances are the differences between the
hypothetical promotion probabilities the White-male plaintiffs would have
received absent of discrimination and the observed promotion probabilities.
Nonparametric [Tableman and Stahel (2009)] and Bayesian [Kadane and
Woodworth (2004); Woodworth and Kadane (2010)] methods have been pro-
posed to model employment data to determine liability. Their focus is the
accurate estimation of the regression coefficient for the variable indicating
the protected group membership. Our goal, however, is to make predictions
of compensatory damages, which requires estimating the probabilities of
having been promoted over time. Pan and Gastwirth (2009) used acceler-
ated failure time models to estimate hypothetical job tenures of plaintiffs
who were discriminated in hiring. Cox proportional hazards models [Cox
(1972, 1975)] are utilized in this manuscript to predict promotion proba-
bilities. Semiparametric models are superior in several aspects. The models
are more flexible, as they only assume multiplicative covariate effects on the
hazard function without forcing the baseline to follow any specific distribu-
tion. Second, when the time axis is set as calendar time, the risk set at each
promotion is composed of the eligible candidates at that time. Therefore, the
model is fitted by maximizing the probabilities of selecting the individuals
who actually received promotion from the candidate pool. In this setting, the
characteristics of the cohort at risk for promotion are fairly stable because
new lieutenants replenish the group eligible for promotion and the seniority
of the remaining lieutenants increases when senior members retire.
Another complication arises because discrimination in one aspect of em-
ployment may also affect other employment decisions. For example, the same
supervisors would select employees for promotion or reduction in force. How-
ever, discrimination in layoffs is unlikely to occur in civil service jobs which
are protected by a tenure-type system, especially when most incumbents
have a fair amount of seniority. In the motivating case Alexander v. Mil-
waukee, the only form of termination is retirement and there were no claims
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against discrimination in processes other than promotion. Still, it is possible
that retirement is affected by the discriminatory practice in promotions. For
example, individuals with delayed or denied promotions due to discrimina-
tion might have less incentives to remain employed after they become eligible
for retirement. Therefore, disparities in both the promotion and retirement
processes need to be considered when estimating the economic damages. Pro-
motion and retirement are semi-competing risks [Fine, Jiang and Chappell
(2001)], as the occurrence of retirement terminates the promotion process,
but retirements can be observed after promotions. Xu, Kalbfleisch and Tai
(2010) model such data structures with three hazard/transition functions—
the transition from no-event status to the promoted status given that neither
promotion nor retirement happened previously, the transition from no-event
status to retired status given that neither events occurred, and the transi-
tion from the promoted status to retired status given the promotion time.
In Alexander v. Milwaukee, the number of years since becoming eligible for
retirement is the most important factor affecting retirement hazard. Condi-
tional on the number of years since becoming eligible, the retirement pat-
tern among lieutenants and that among captains are similar [The New York
Times, Goldstein (2011)]. Thus, the retirement process is modeled regard-
less of the promotion status. Unlike competing risk data, the distribution of
the retirement times is identifiable [Peng and Fine (2007)]. Furthermore, we
model the promotion risk conditional on that retirement has not occurred.
Similar to the cause-specific instantaneous rate of occurrence in competing
risks [Lin (1997)] which requires that no event of any type has happened, the
promotion hazard among nonretired employees is conditional on that neither
promotion nor retirement has occurred. It is different from the promotion
hazard conditional on that promotion has not occurred. In summary, we
model two hazard/transition functions - the retirement process and the pro-
motion process conditional on that retirement has not occurred, respectively.
This can be viewed as the univariate event counterpart of Cook and Law-
less (1997) approach modeling recurrent events in the presence of a terminal
event, where the recurrent event mean/rate at time point t is conditional on
that the terminal event time is larger than t.
As the promotion and retirement probabilities are time-varying, a more
concise summary of the processes is provided by the durations of time the
plaintiff would be in each position. In biomedical studies, researchers are in-
terested in the restricted mean lifetime during a specific period following the
treatment, for example, 10 years, because the treatment effects will not last
beyond 10 years. Chen and Tsiatis (2001) used the difference in restricted
mean lifetimes as a measure of treatment effects. Zhang and Schaubel (2011)
studied restricted mean lifetime subject to informative censoring. In the mo-
tivating example, lieutenants, captains and retired officers received different
salaries or pensions. Therefore, we estimate the hypothetical restricted mean
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durations of the three statuses (not promoted, promoted, retired) during the
period for which the plaintiffs deserve compensation, that is, from the be-
ginning of the discriminatory practice to the cutoff time determined by the
court.
This manuscript studies the estimation of hypothetical restricted mean
job durations assuming that the discrimination did not happen for the pur-
pose of compensating prevailing plaintiffs. The paper is organized as fol-
lows. The restricted mean duration estimator is constructed in Section 2.
The asymptotic distribution is derived in Section 3. The accuracy of the
estimator’s asymptotic properties in moderate size samples is examined by
simulations in Section 4. The proposed estimator is applied to the motivat-
ing reverse discrimination case in Section 5. Additional issues in estimating
compensation are discussed in Section 6.
2. Proposed estimators. The notation will be described in the context
of the motivating example. There are n employees indexed by i, i= 1, . . . , n.
The time axis is calendar time. When the ith employee reaches the rank of
lieutenant, he or she becomes eligible for promotion to captain. Thus, the
calendar date an officer becomes lieutenant is the date that individual enters
the promotion process, denoted by P1i. The date, if any, when the ith em-
ployee is promoted to captain is denoted by P ∗2i. Retirement terminates the
promotion process and the data collection time censors both promotions and
retirements. Denote the retirement date and the end of data collection for
subject i as R∗2i and Ci, respectively. We observe P2i =min{P
∗
2i,R
∗
2i,Ci} and
use δPi = I(P2i = P
∗
2i) to indicate an observed promotion event. Here I(A) is
an indicator function which equals 1 when A is true and 0 otherwise. Similar
notation is used for the retirement process. Police officers become eligible
for retirement after 25 years of service in the department. Thus, they enter
the retirement process on that day, R1i. The end of the retirement process,
R∗2i, occurs when the policeman retires but is also censored at the time of
data collection, Ci. Thus, the observed time of the retirement process is
R2i =min{R
∗
2i,Ci}, and δ
R
i = I(Ci >R
∗
2i) indicates whether R2i is a retire-
ment time or censoring time. The observed data consist of n independent and
identically distributed vectors, (P1i, P2i, δ
P
i ,X
′
i(t),R1i,R2i, δ
R
i ,Z
′
i(t))
′, where
the covariates for the promotion process, Xi(t), and those for the retirement
process, Zi(t), include both fixed and time-varying elements. The covariate
sets X ′i(t) and Z
′
i(t) often overlap, as some factors may play a role in both
promotion and retirement decisions.
The semi-competing risk data is decomposed into the retirement process
and the promotion process conditional on that retirement has not occurred.
The corresponding hazard functions are defined as follows:
dΛPi (t) = lim
△t→0
Pr(t≤ P ∗2i < t+△t|P
∗
2i ≥ t,R
∗
2i ≥ t)
△t
I(P1i ≤ t),
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dΛRi (t) = lim
△t→0
Pr(t≤R∗2i < t+△t|R
∗
2i ≥ t)
△t
I(R1i ≤ t).
Notice we require P1i ≤ t and R1i ≤ t so that dΛ
P
i (t) = 0 for t < P1i and
dΛRi (t) = 0 for t < R1i. The two hazard functions are modeled by two Cox
proportional hazards models
dΛPi (t) = dΛ
P
0 (t) exp(Xi(t)
′β0),(1)
dΛRi (t) = dΛ
R
0 (t) exp(Zi(t)
′θ0),(2)
where dΛP0 (t) and dΛ
R
0 (t) denote the unspecified baseline hazard functions
over calendar time and the two vectors β0, θ0 represent the true values of the
regression coefficients. In the risk set of model (1), we do not differentiate
lieutenants who are eligible for retirement and those who are not yet eligible
because seniority is a covariate and officers with the same seniority usually
have similar promotion chances, regardless if eligible for retirement or not.
We assume
lim
△t→0
△t−1Pr(t≤ P ∗2i < t+△t|t≤ P
∗
2i, t≤R
∗
2i,Xi(t),Zi(t),R
∗
2i)
= lim
△t→0
△t−1Pr(t≤ P ∗2i < t+△t|t≤ P
∗
2i, t≤R
∗
2i,Xi(t),Zi(t)),
lim
△t→0
△t−1Pr(t≤R∗2i < t+△t|t≤R
∗
2i,Xi(t),Zi(t), P
∗
2i)
= lim
△t→0
△t−1Pr(t≤R∗2i < t+△t|t≤R
∗
2i,Xi(t),Zi(t)).
That is, conditional on Xi(t) and Zi(t), dΛ
P
i (t) and dΛ
R
i (t) are assumed
to be independent. This assumption would be violated in the presence of
latent variables affecting both processes. However, models assuming latent
variables would not be accepted in courts (King v. Acosta Sales and Market-
ing Inc., 678 F.3d 470 2012). Nevertheless, the sensitivity of the proposed
estimators to moderate deviations from this independence assumption is
studied in Table 2.
For any time point after P1i, there are three possible statuses for each
subject—not retired and remaining a lieutenant, not retired and being a
captain, and retired. The probabilities for each of the three statuses are
Pr(P ∗2i > t,R
∗
2i > t) = Pr(P
∗
2i > t|R
∗
2i > t)Pr(R
∗
2i > t),
Pr(P ∗2i ≤ t,R
∗
2i > t) = Pr(P
∗
2i ≤ t|R
∗
2i > t)Pr(R
∗
2i > t),
Pr(R1i ≤R
∗
2i ≤ t) = Pr(R
∗
2i ≤ t).
Again, we do not differentiate between t < R1i and t≥R1i in the first two
statuses. Therefore, the probability Pr(P ∗2i > t,R
∗
2i > t) is the probability
of being a lieutenant and not retired where the officer is either eligible or
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ineligible for retirement, and Pr(P ∗2i ≤ t,R
∗
2i > t) is the probability of being
a captain and having not retired regardless of eligibility for retirement.
Notice that the probability of having been promoted to captain equals the
sum of the probability of being a captain and not retired and the probability
of having been promoted and retired. That is,
Pr(P ∗2i ≤ t) = Pr(P
∗
2i ≤ t,R
∗
2i > t) + Pr(P
∗
2i ≤ t,R
∗
2i ≤ t)
for any t > P1i. Similarly,
Pr(P ∗2i > t) = Pr(P
∗
2i > t,R
∗
2i > t) + Pr(P
∗
2i > t,R
∗
2i ≤ t),
Pr(R∗2i ≤ t) = Pr(R
∗
2i ≤ t,P
∗
2i > t) + Pr(R
∗
2i ≤ t,P
∗
2i ≤ t),
Pr(R∗2i > t) = Pr(R
∗
2i > t,P
∗
2i > t) + Pr(R
∗
2i > t,P
∗
2i ≤ t).
The three probabilities of interests, Pr(P ∗2i > t,R
∗
2i > t), Pr(P
∗
2i ≤ t,R
∗
2i > t)
and Pr(R∗2i ≤ t), can be estimated from models (1) and (2). But Pr(P
∗
2i ≤
t,R∗2i ≤ t) and Pr(P
∗
2i > t,R
∗
2i ≤ t) are unidentifiable because the distribu-
tion of P ∗2i is unobserved after R
∗
2i [Fine, Jiang and Chappell (2001); Xu,
Kalbfleisch and Tai (2010)].
The expected lengths of time being a lieutenant (T lt), a captain (T cap)
or retired (T rt) restricted to [τ0, τ1] are
E(T lt) =
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
Pr(P ∗2i > t > P1i,R
∗
2i > t)dt
=
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
Pr(P ∗2i > t > P1i|R
∗
2i > t)Pr(R
∗
2i > t)dt,
E(T cap) =
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
Pr(P ∗2i ≤ t,R
∗
2i > t)dt(3)
=
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
Pr(P ∗2i ≤ t|R
∗
2i > t)Pr(R
∗
2i > t)dt,
E(T rt) =
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
Pr(R∗2 ≤ t)dt.
The restricted mean job duration calculation starts from τ0 or P1i, whichever
happens later, because an officer could not be discriminated against promo-
tion to captain until P1i (date becoming a lieutenant) and τ0 (the time the
discriminatory chief was appointed).
The number of observed promotion and retirement events up to time
point t are defined as NPi (t) = δ
P
i I(P2i ≤ t) and N
R
i (t) = δ
R
i I(R2i ≤ t), re-
spectively. Let dNPi (s) =N
P
i (s)−N
P
i (s
−) and dNRi (s) =N
R
i (s)−N
R
i (s
−),
then NPi (t) =
∫ t
τ0
dNPi (s) and N
R
i (t) =
∫ t
τ0
dNRi (s). The corresponding at-
risk indicators are denoted by Y Pi (t) = I(P1i ≤ t≤ P2i) and Y
R
i (t) = I(R1i ≤
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t≤R2i). The parameters β0 and θ0 are estimated by β̂ and θ̂, the solution
to the partial likelihood score functions, UP (β) = 0 and UR(θ) = 0, which
are defined as
UP (β) =
n∑
i=1
∫ τ1
τ0
UPi (β) =
n∑
i=1
∫ τ1
τ0
{Xi(t)−X(t;β)}dN
P
i (t),
UR(θ) =
n∑
i=1
∫ τ1
τ0
URi (β) =
n∑
i=1
∫ τ1
τ0
{Zi(t)−Z(t; θ)}dN
R
i (t),
where
X(β; t) =
S
(1)
P (t;β)
S
(0)
P (t;β)
,
Z(θ; t) =
S
(1)
R (t; θ)
S
(0)
R (t; θ)
,
S
(k)
P (t;β) = n
−1
n∑
i=1
Y Pi (t)e
β′Xi(t)Xi(t)
⊗k,
S
(k)
R (t; θ) = n
−1
n∑
i=1
Y Ri (t)e
θ′Zi(t)Zi(t)
⊗k, k = 0,1,2,
where Xi(t)
⊗0 = 1,Zi(t)
⊗0 = 1, Xi(t)
⊗1 =Xi(t),Zi(t)
⊗1 = Zi(t) and X
⊗2
i =
Xi(t)Xi(t)
′,Z⊗2i = Zi(t)Zi(t)
′. The Breslow–Aalen baseline hazard estima-
tors, Λ̂P0 (t; β̂) and Λ̂
R
0 (t; θ̂), are employed, where
dΛ̂P0 (t;β) = n
−1
n∑
i=1
S
(0)
P (t;β)
−1 dNPi (t),
dΛ̂R0 (t; θ) = n
−1
n∑
i=1
S
(0)
R (t; θ)
−1 dNRi (t).
The covariates (Xi(t),Zi(t)) can be decomposed into (Xi(t) = {xi1,Xi2(t)},
Zi(t) = {zi1,Zi2(t)}), where xi1 = zi1 are indicators for White-male and
Xi2(t),Zi2(t) denote other factors considered in the promotion and retire-
ment processes. We set
X˜i(t) = {0,Xi2(t)},
Z˜i(t) = {0,Zi2(t)}.
That is, the White-male indicator is set to zero while other covariates (Xi2(t),
Zi2(t)) remain the same. The goal is to estimate the promotion/retirement
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probabilities and restricted mean job tenures the plaintiffs would have re-
ceived had they been treated the same as the nondiscriminated members of
the department. This is achieved by using the hypothetical covariate values
(X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) in estimating E(T
cap), E(T lt) and E(T rt).
The survival functions from models (1) and (2) for a subject with covariate
values (X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) and entry times P1i,R1i are estimated by
ŜP (t|X˜i(t)) = exp
{
−
∫ t
P1i
dΛ̂P0 (r)e
β̂′X˜i(r)
}
,
(4)
ŜR(t|Z˜i(t)) = exp
{
−
∫ t
R1i
dΛ̂R0 (r)e
θ̂′Z˜i(r)
}
,
where unknown parameters dΛP0 (t), dΛ
R
0 (t), β, θ are replaced by their maxi-
mum partial likelihood estimators. Furthermore, combining (3) and (4),
Ê(T lt|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))
=
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
ŜP (t|X˜i(t))Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))dt(5)
=
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
exp
{
−
∫ t
P1i
dΛ̂P0 (u)e
β̂′X˜i(u)
}
× exp
{
−
∫ t
R1i
dΛ̂R0 (u)e
θ̂′Z˜i(u)
}
dt,
Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))
=
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
{1− ŜP (t|X˜i(t))}Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))dt
(6)
=
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
[
1− exp
{
−
∫ t
P1i
dΛ̂P0 (u)e
β̂′X˜i(u)
}]
× exp
{
−
∫ t
R1i
dΛ̂R0 (u)e
θ̂′Z˜i(u)
}
dt,
Ê(T rt|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))
=
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
{1− ŜR(t|Z˜i(t))}dt(7)
=
∫ τ1
max(τ0,P1i)
[
1− exp
{
−
∫ t
R1i
dΛ̂R0 (u)e
θ̂′Z˜i(u)
}]
dt.
Here, we use ŜP (t|Zi(t)) to estimate Pr(P
∗
2i > t > P1i|R
∗
2i > t) because
the two processes being modeled are assumed to be independent given the
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covariates. Therefore, the probability of being a lieutenant among all non-
retired employees equal that of subjects who are not retired by time t.
3. Asymptotic properties. The following regularity conditions are as-
sumed:
(a) (P1i, P2i, δ
P
i ,X
′
i(t),R1i,R2i, δ
R
i ,Z
′
i(t))
′ are independent and identically
distributed;
(b) lim△t→0△t
−1Pr(t ≤ P ∗2i < t + △t|t ≤ P
∗
2i, t < R
∗
2i, t < Ci,Xi(t)) =
lim△t→0△t
−1Pr(t≤ P ∗2i < t+△t|t≤ P
∗
2i, t < R
∗
2i,Xi(t));
(c) lim△t→0△t
−1Pr(t ≤ R∗2i < t + △t|t ≤ R
∗
2i, t < Ci,Zi(t)) =
lim△t→0△t
−1Pr(t≤R∗2i < t+△t|t≤R
∗
2i,Zi(t));
(d)
∫ τ1
τ0
dΛP0 (t)<∞,
∫ τ1
τ0
dΛR0 (t)<∞;
(e) Elements of Zi(t) and Xi(t) are bounded almost surely for t ∈ [τ0, τ1];
(f) Positive-definiteness of the Hessian matrices, AP (β) and AR(θ), where
AP (β) = E
[∫ τ1
τ0
{Xi(t)−X(t;β)}
⊗2
Y Pi (t)e
β′Xi(t) dΛ̂P0 (t)
]
,
AR(θ) = E
[∫ τ1
τ0
{Zi(t)−Z(t; θ)}
⊗2
Y Ri (t)e
θ′Zi(t) dΛ̂R0 (t)
]
.
Condition (a) is usually satisfied unless there are clustered or grouped sub-
jects. Conditions (b) and (c) assume noninformative and independent cen-
soring. Condition (d) and (e) requires the cumulative baseline hazard func-
tions and the covariates to be bounded. Condition (f) guarantees the Hessian
matrices are nonsingular and their inverses exist.
The asymptotic properties for Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) are summarized in
Theorems 1 and 2. The details of the proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. Under conditions (a) to (f),
Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))
a.s.
−→E(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)).
Theorem 2. Under conditions (a) to (f), n1/2{Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) −
E(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))} converges weakly to a mean-zero Gaussian process with
variance E[{
∫ τ1
τ0
ξi(t)dt}
2], where
ξi(t) = {Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))(−ξ
P
i1(t)− ξ
P
i2(t))
+ (1− SP (t|X˜i(t)))(ξ
R
i1(t) + ξ
R
i2(t))},
ξPi1(t) =−Ŝ
P (t|X˜i(t))
∫ t
P1i
[eβ
′
0X˜i(u){X˜i(u)−X(u;β0)}dΛ̂
P
0 (u;β0)]
×{AP (β0)}
−1
UPi (β0),
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ξPi2(t) =−S
P (t|X˜i(t))
∫ t
P1i
eβ
′
0X˜i(u)
dMPi (u;β0)
s
(0)
P (u;β0)
,
ξRi1(t) =−Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))
∫ t
R1i
[eθ
′
0Z˜i(u){Z˜i(u)−Z(u; θ0)}dΛ̂
R
0 (u; θ0)]
×AR(θ0)
−1
URi (θ0),
ξRi2(t) =−S
R(t|Z˜i(t))
∫ t
R1i
eθ
′
0Z˜i(u)
dMRi (u; θ0)
s
(0)
R (u; θ0)
,
s
(0)
P (u;β) = limn→∞
S
(0)
P (u;β),
dMPi (u;β) = dN
P
i (u)− Y
P
i (u)e
β′Xi(u) dΛP0 (u),
s
(0)
R (u; θ) = limn→∞
S
(0)
R (u; θ),
dMRi (u; θ) = dN
R
i (u)− Y
R
i (u)e
θ′Zi(u) dΛR0 (u).
Here, E[{
∫ τ1
τ0
ξi(t)dt}
2] can be estimated by replacing parameters with
their maximum likelihood estimates and expectations with sample averages.
The asymptotic distributions of Ê(T lt|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) and Ê(T
rt|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))
are derived similarly.
4. Simulation studies. Data sets with n = 500 independent and identi-
cally distributed pairs of promotion among employees and retirement times
are generated. Both processes start at time zero for all subjects. The hazard
functions follow proportional hazards models,
dΛP (t|Xi) = dΛ
P
0 (t)e
β1Xi1+β2Xi2 ,
dΛR(t|Zi) = dΛ
R
0 (t)e
θ1Zi1+θ2Zi2 ,
where Xi1 = Zi1 (minority or unfavored group indicator) is distributed as
Bernoulli (0.5), and covariates Xi2 and Zi2 follow Uniform (0,10) and Nor-
mal (0,4), respectively. Both baseline functions are constant over time where
λP0 (t) =
1
10 and λ
R
0 (t) =
1
60 . The coefficients for Xi1 are Zi1 are set to (β1 =
0, θ1 = 0), (β1 = −0.5, θ1 = 0.5) or (β1 = −0.5, θ1 = 1). The coefficients for
Xi2 and Zi2 are β2 = θ2 = 0.1. Censoring is uniformly distributed on (0,200),
which leads to approximately 36% censoring in the promotion process and
14% in the retirement process. Each data configuration is repeated 1000
times.
Table 1 lists the performance of Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) restricted to [0, τ ].
Various combinations of X˜i, Z˜i and two time points τ = 5 and τ = 10 are
examined. In all these configurations, Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) is close to the
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Table 1
Simulation results: Performance of Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))
θ1 X˜i2 Z˜i2 τ E(T
cap) bias ESD ASE CP
0 1 1 5 1.280 −0.001 0.101 0.096 0.941
0 1 1 10 3.784 0.002 0.237 0.207 0.906
0 2 5 5 1.344 0.006 0.117 0.106 0.925
0 2 5 10 3.816 −0.012 0.239 0.222 0.920
0.5 1 1 5 1.280 0.003 0.098 0.095 0.933
0.5 1 1 10 3.784 −0.010 0.233 0.211 0.927
0.5 2 5 5 1.344 −0.004 0.113 0.104 0.929
0.5 2 5 10 3.816 0.002 0.244 0.226 0.925
1 1 1 5 1.280 −0.003 0.100 0.097 0.940
1 1 1 10 3.784 −0.005 0.225 0.219 0.937
1 2 5 5 1.344 0.001 0.112 0.107 0.938
1 2 5 10 3.816 −0.010 0.254 0.236 0.935
true values obtained by numerical integration, and the average estimated
asymptotic standard errors (ASE) agree with the empirical standard devi-
ations (ESD). The empirical coverage probabilities (CP) are close to the
nominal value of 0.95.
Promotion among employees and retirement are assumed to be indepen-
dent conditional on the covariates Xi(t) and Zi(t). However, there might
be unmeasured latent variables that affect both processes and lead to cor-
related residuals from the proportional hazards models (1) and (2). To test
the robustness of the proposed restricted mean job duration estimators to
unadjusted frailties, sensitivity analyses are carried out. Following the liter-
ature [Ye, Kalbfleisch and Schaubel (2007)], a gamma frailty is generated,
which multiplies the hazard rates of both processes. The frailty terms are
independent from Xi1 and Zi1. Without loss of generality, we set the mean
of the gamma random variable to be one and examine three values for the
variance: 0.5, 1 and 2. The same parameter and covariate values used in the
middle four rows in Table 1 are employed in the sensitivity analysis. The
true values of E(T cap) are obtained by integrating over the gamma frailty
distribution and listed in column 10 of Table 2. The estimates of the re-
gression coefficients from the two Cox proportional hazards models ignoring
the frailty term are biased toward zero. The ASEs are close to the corre-
sponding ESDs even in the presence of a frailty. Although constructed from
the biased coefficients and baseline hazard estimates ignoring frailties, the
restricted mean job duration estimates are not very different from the true
values, where the magnitudes of most of the biases are less than 10% of the
true values. The proposed variance estimates of Ê(T cap) are slightly smaller
than the empirical ones, and the coverage probabilities range from 86% to
94%. In summary, the proposed methods are reasonably robust in making
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Table 2
Sensitivity of Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) to frailty. β0 =−0.5, θ0 = 0.5
β̂1 θ̂1 Ê(T
cap)
Var bias ESD ASE CP bias ESD ASE CP true bias ESD ASE CP
0.5 0.056 0.117 0.116 0.923 −0.125 0.103 0.103 0.769 1.164 −0.036 0.101 0.096 0.911
0.5 0.057 0.117 0.116 0.923 −0.118 0.105 0.103 0.782 3.303 −0.091 0.223 0.208 0.908
0.5 0.065 0.113 0.116 0.922 −0.124 0.100 0.103 0.771 1.151 0.017 0.110 0.107 0.936
0.5 0.052 0.119 0.116 0.923 −0.122 0.104 0.103 0.759 3.160 0.109 0.253 0.230 0.908
1 0.087 0.117 0.119 0.891 −0.187 0.113 0.108 0.588 1.071 −0.047 0.095 0.093 0.912
1 0.094 0.121 0.120 0.869 −0.185 0.109 0.108 0.621 2.950 −0.077 0.217 0.205 0.908
1 0.087 0.125 0.120 0.873 −0.189 0.107 0.108 0.568 1.050 0.015 0.113 0.104 0.931
1 0.087 0.121 0.119 0.882 −0.185 0.109 0.108 0.575 2.796 0.119 0.239 0.227 0.915
2 0.103 0.128 0.129 0.871 −0.243 0.118 0.118 0.448 0.930 −0.029 0.094 0.090 0.916
2 0.105 0.129 0.128 0.855 −0.251 0.118 0.118 0.433 2.456 −0.014 0.210 0.201 0.928
2 0.107 0.130 0.128 0.862 −0.244 0.118 0.118 0.448 0.900 0.040 0.108 0.102 0.928
2 0.106 0.127 0.128 0.871 −0.252 0.120 0.117 0.421 2.295 0.098 0.235 0.225 0.864
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predictions in the presence of frailty terms. Unlike clinical trials, employees
are not randomized into the protected and unprotected groups, so a latent
variable may be distributed differently in the two groups. If such a con-
founder exists, the coefficient estimators β̂1, θ̂1 and the mean restricted job
duration estimators will be biased (results not shown).
5. Application. Officer Arthur Jones was the Police Chief of the City of
Milwaukee from November 18th, 1996 to November 18th, 2003. During his
tenure there were 112 White-male lieutenants and 34 female or non-White
lieutenants who were eligible for promotion. He selected 21 White-males
and 20 others for promotion, thus, White-males had a promotion rate of
19% in contrast to the 59% rate for females and non-White-males. Further-
more, among promoted individuals, the average length of time the White-
male lieutenants served before becoming captain was 7.36 years, while the
average length for the others was 3.02 years (p-value of the Wilcoxon test
< 0.001). Seventeen White-male lieutenants brought a reverse discrimination
case against the City of Milwaukee. At trial, a jury found the defendants
liable for discrimination against the plaintiffs in promotion to captain. Com-
pensatory damages for the plaintiffs’ economic loss in wages and pensions as
well as punitive damages were ordered. The defendants’ motions to vacate
both the liability and damages were denied by the district court judge and
they appealed the decision. In January 2007, the appellate court affirmed
the district court’s decision on liability but remanded the case for a more
accurate calculation of lost pay. In its opinion, the 7th Circuit reiterated
its recommendation that in cases where the number of eligible members of
the protected group (White-males) exceeds the number of available posi-
tions, the lost chance doctrine, which originated in tort law, should be used,
stating “Loss of a chance is illustrated by cases in which, as a result of a
physician’s negligent failure to make a correct diagnosis, his patient’s can-
cer is not arrested, and he dies—but he probably would have died anyway.
The trier of fact will estimate the probability that the patient would have
survived but for the physician’s negligence—say it is 25%—and will award
that percentage of the damages the patient would have received had it been
certain that he would have survived but for the negligence.” [Alexander v.
Milwaukee , 474 F. 3d 437, 7th Cir. (2007).]
The plaintiffs filed the case on June 27th, 2003, however, the depart-
ment would have known about the charge earlier. Although Chief Jones
remained in the position until 11/18/2003, often employers change their
employment practices after a charge has been formally filed [Freidlin and
Gastwirth (2000)]. Therefore, the court decided to rely on data between
11/18/1996 and 5/31/2003 in both its liability determination and compen-
sation calculations, which is also used in our analysis.
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Statistical tests for potential discrimination in sequential employment de-
cisions, for example, hiring, promotion or termination, are discussed by
Gastwirth (1984), Kadane (1990), Gastwirth and Greenhouse (1995) and
Finkelstein and Levin (2001, pages 245–249). In Alexander v. Milwaukee, of-
ficers at the Sergeant rank for at least a year were eligible to be promoted to
lieutenant when an opening on the lieutenant rank became available. The av-
erage length of time for a newly hired police officer to become a lieutenant
in our data is 18.21 years in White-males and 15.76 in non-White-males
(p-value = 0.4058). No claims of discrimination were filed for promotion to
lieutenant and this issue was not mentioned in the legal decisions. Had there
been evidence of discrimination at lower ranks, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would
probably have expanded the class of plaintiffs in the case. Therefore, it is
doubtful that the discriminatory practices affected that position.
First, both the promotion process and the retirement process are mod-
eled through Cox models. Seniority in the promotion process is measured by
the number of years the subject has served as a lieutenant. The functional
form for this time-varying covariate is quadratic. The number of years since
becoming eligible for retirement, which is also time-varying, is used in the
retirement model. Both these two time-varying covariates are essentially the
follow-up times in the two processes, which usually cannot be used as co-
variates. However, because our time axis is calendar time, people enter the
processes on different calendar dates and candidates in the risk set have
different follow-up times on the same calendar date. Therefore, we are able
to estimate the effects of number of years since lieutenant and number of
years since becoming eligible for retirement. Three time-invariant covari-
ates are also considered: membership in the protected group (White-male
or not), position (detective vs. police), number of years served in the police
force before becoming a lieutenant. While in some cases measures of per-
formance and disciplinary issues might have been considered, neither the
district nor the appellate court opinions mentioned any analysis incorporat-
ing these factors. The defendant did not submit any data about them, so
it is unlikely they would differ much in the two groups. The proportional
hazards assumption between White-males and others is examined by the
parallel pattern of the log-cumulative-baseline-hazards functions. The out-
puts of the two Cox models are given in Table 3. In the model for the pro-
motion risk among employees, the White-male factor is highly significantly
negative (p-value< 0.001), demonstrating that White-male lieutenants had
much lower promotion chances than non-White-male employees with similar
seniority and job assignment. The length of time served as a lieutenant is
also significant. The coefficient for its square term is negative, which indi-
cates that the promotion chance among lieutenants initially increased with
years of service, but then reached a peak and declined afterward. In the
retirement data, 64 of the 112 individuals became eligible for retirement
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Table 3
Analysis of Alexander v. Milwaukee: Estimated regression parameters from proportional
hazards models. The columns eβ̂k and eθ̂k are the hazards ratios
Covariate, Zik =Xik β̂k e
β̂k p-value θ̂k e
θ̂k p-value
White-male −2.13 0.12 <0.001 0.18 1.20 0.767
Detective −0.17 0.84 0.611 −0.23 0.79 0.425
Years before lieutenant −0.01 0.99 0.856 −0.10 0.90 0.007
Years since lieutenant 0.41 1.51 0.012 – – –
Years since lieutenant2 −0.02 0.98 0.089 – – –
Years eligible for retire – – – 0.12 1.13 0.017
during the period. Of them, 45 retired and 19 remained on the job as of
May 31st, 2003. Only three non-White-male officers retired in the period
and the White-male factor is not significant in the retirement process. Each
additional year after reaching eligibility increases the retirement hazard by
13% (p-value = 0.017), holding the protected group membership, job assign-
ment and number of years before lieutenant constant. Also, the number of
years served before lieutenant is negatively correlated with retirement (Haz-
ards Ratio = 0.90, p-value = 0.007). There were two lieutenants on Leave of
Absence (LOA), a Black male hired on 7/24/1978 and a White female hired
on 7/30/1979, which were treated as censored. The results in Table 3 are
robust when the two LOA cases were deleted or treated as terminations.
The compensation estimates are based on the hypothetical scenario of no
discrimination, where the plaintiffs would have been treated the same as non-
White-males. The distributions of the three covariates in the White-male
and non-White-male groups overlap. The ranges of the numbers of years
before and after lieutenant in the plaintiffs are (10.97, 26.83) and (1.93,
12.88). The corresponding ranges in the non-White-male group are (8.90,
26.60) and (0.21, 8.90). Therefore, there were non-White-male members with
similar qualifications as the plaintiffs. The estimated probabilities of being a
captain and not retired, ŜR(t|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)){1− Ŝ
P (t|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))}, for the 17
plaintiffs are plotted in Figure 1. The probabilities of being a captain and not
retired peak at around 5 years after becoming a lieutenant. The promotion
probabilities for plaintiffs 14, 15, 16 and 17 who were lieutenants for less
than two years never exceeded 0.5 during the period. In contrast, plaintiffs
who became lieutenants in 1996 and 1997 (e.g., plaintiffs 2, 5, 6, 7 and 9)
have probabilities over 0.8 by May 2003. The probabilities for plaintiffs 3 and
4 peak around 2000 and then decrease because their retirement probabilities
increase after 2000.
Then, we estimate the expected lengths being a lieutenant, being a cap-
tain and being retired restricted to the period [11/18/1996, 5/31/2003] for
each plaintiff in Table 4. Consistent with the finding of discrimination, the
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Fig. 1. Probability of being a captain and not retired, Pr(P ∗2i ≤ t,R
∗
2i > t) =
ŜR(t|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))×{1− Ŝ
P (t|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))}, for the 17 plaintiffs in the period [11/18/1996,
5/31/2003].
expected length of time one would remain a lieutenant Ê(T lt) is always
smaller than the observed length T lt. The expected number of months be-
ing a captain are nonzero for every plaintiff, as they all lost some chance
of being a captain, although their observed months of being a captain dur-
ing the period are zero. Some plaintiffs have zero expected months of be-
ing retired because they never became eligible for retirement during the
period. The sum of the expected months as a lieutenant, captain or in re-
tirement equals the sum of the corresponding observed months for each
plaintiff.
The compensatory damages proposed by the District Court were calcu-
lated according to a set of specific instructions. For each plaintiff the jury
selected one date for the possible promotion of each plaintiff along with an
estimated probability that the plaintiff would have been promoted that day.
Contrary to the time-varying probability estimates in Figure 1 which incor-
porate relevant covariates, the probabilities used in the District Court were
either 0.50 (plaintiffs 1 and 10) or 0.80 (all other plaintiffs). The retirement
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Table 4
Analysis of Alexander v. Milwaukee: Columns Ê(T lt), Ê(T cap) and Ê(T rt) are the
expected number of months being a lieutenant, a captain and in retirement for each of the
17 plaintiffs under the hypothetical nondiscriminatory scenario. Columns T lt, T cap and
T rt are the corresponding observed number of months under the real life scenario where
the plaintiffs suffered discrimination
Plaintiff Ê(T lt)SE(Ê(T lt)) T lt Ê(T cap)SE(Ê(T cap))T cap Ê(T rt)SE(Ê(T rt)) T rt
1 39.16 5.98 62.99 30.84 6.35 0.00 3.42 2.10 10.36
2 13.48 4.80 78.41 64.96 4.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 15.52 5.85 78.41 30.44 12.59 0.00 32.48 10.26 0.00
4 19.17 6.71 78.41 40.47 10.52 0.00 18.81 06.35 0.00
5 32.68 6.38 78.41 45.76 6.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6 29.85 5.03 78.41 48.59 5.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 34.03 6.51 78.41 44.42 6.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 31.13 6.87 78.41 19.86 9.86 0.00 26.56 10.22 0.00
9 41.39 5.36 72.92 31.56 5.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 39.45 5.52 66.25 23.61 5.98 0.00 3.22 1.84 0.00
11 32.42 4.08 54.74 22.36 4.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 18.90 1.68 23.21 4.34 1.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 31.04 4.83 51.75 19.13 4.96 0.00 1.61 1.02 0.00
14 20.91 2.50 30.12 9.24 2.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 21.11 2.99 30.12 8.58 3.02 0.00 0.49 0.33 0.00
16 21.17 2.60 30.12 8.98 2.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 32.19 3.78 54.74 22.59 3.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
dates for each plaintiff used in the jury’s calculation were the observed ones
(if the plaintiff retired during the period) or the first day he became eli-
gible (if the plaintiff did not retire during the period). Table 5 compares
the estimated numbers of months that plaintiffs 1 to 13 would have served
in different levels (Lieutenant, Captain and retirement) obtained from the
proposed method and those determined by the original jury. The jury’s esti-
mates for Plaintiffs 13 to 17 were not available to us. Although the estimates
are close in a few cases (plaintiffs 1 and 10), there are a number of substan-
tial discrepancies (plaintiffs 2, 6, 7, 8, 9) and noticeable ones (plaintiffs 3, 4,
5, 11, 12, 13).
6. Discussion. This paper provides a method for estimating the length of
time plaintiffs who were discriminated against would have been in a higher
position. In the motivating example the promotion process was of primary
interest and retirement terminates an employee’s eligibility for further pro-
motion. Estimators of the mean durations for remaining at the lower posi-
tion, being at the higher position and being retired, restricted to the relevant
time interval, are obtained. The asymptotic distributions of the restricted
mean life time estimators are derived and shown to perform well in finite
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Table 5
Analysis of Alexander v. Milwaukee: Comparison of the proposed job and retirement
duration estimates and the previous estimates reversed by the circuit court (months)
Lieutenant Captain Retired
Plaintiff Ê(Tproposed) Ê(Tjury) Ê(Tproposed) Ê(Tjury) Ê(Tproposed) Ê(Tjury)
1 39.16 30.64 30.84 32.38 3.42 10.39
2 13.48 52.83 64.96 25.58 0.00 0.00
3 15.52 39.78 30.44 38.63 32.48 0.00
4 19.17 31.13 40.47 47.28 18.81 0.00
5 32.68 26.70 45.76 51.72 0.00 0.00
6 29.85 70.95 48.59 7.46 0.00 0.00
7 34.03 52.83 44.42 25.58 0.00 0.00
8 31.13 44.98 19.86 32.55 26.56 0.00
9 41.39 51.42 31.56 21.50 0.00 0.00
10 39.45 43.63 23.61 22.62 3.22 0.00
11 32.42 36.16 22.36 18.58 0.00 0.00
12 18.90 15.75 4.34 7.46 0.00 0.00
13 31.04 41.65 19.13 10.09 1.61 0.00
samples in our simulation studies. The proposed compensation estimators
are obtained by assuming a non-White-male counterpart with similar qual-
ifications for each plaintiff. The methodology is applied to obtain the three
restricted mean job durations absent discrimination and their standard er-
rors for each plaintiff in Alexander v. Milwaukee.
The context of legal cases is different from the causal inference widely
used in epidemiologic studies and clinical trials [Rubin (1974); Haviland
and Nagin (2005)]. First, our ultimate goal is not to derive the causal re-
lationship between the White-male factor and promotion risks. As empha-
sized by Judge Easterbrook in Biondo v. City of Chicago (382 F.3d 680,
7th Cir. 2004), the purpose of awarding damages is to put the plaintiffs in
the position they should have been in during the period of time they de-
serve compensation. The “gold standard” for determining the compensation
due a White-male lieutenant who suffered discrimination in promotion is
based on the promotion and retirement probabilities of a similarly qualified
non-White-male lieutenant during the period of discrimination. Second, the
standard of proof in civil cases is the preponderance of the evidence or “more
likely than not.” It is less stringent than the criteria scientific research uses to
determine a causal relationship. Third, only characteristics which were actu-
ally considered as promotion criteria (e.g., seniority, performance, education,
exam scores. . . ) will be considered as potential confounders. For a hypothet-
ical example, suppose there had been another covariate—accent in speaking
English—that was significantly correlated with the White-male factor and
the promotion risks. However, as long as accent was not used as a criterion in
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the promotion process, we should not adjust for it as a confounder. Fourth,
if there are other potential confounders that were used as promotion criteria,
presumably the defendant would include them in their analysis. Indeed, once
a plaintiff submits a reasonable statistical analysis incorporating the main
covariates, the defendant cannot simply suggest another omitted variable
that might explain the disparity. Rather the defendant should incorporate
subject-level information on that factor into their analysis. Last, in contrast
to areas employing causal inference (e.g., clinical trials), where one wishes to
generalize the results to a much larger population, the disparity estimated
between White-male and non-White-males in the Milwaukee Police Depart-
ment in the period under study is not generalizable to other departments or
other time periods.
When the wages and pension benefits are stable over time, the com-
pensatory damages can be calculated as WageltÊ(T
lt) +WagecapÊ(T
cap) +
PensionÊ(T rt) minus the plaintiffs’ actual earnings. However, wages and
pensions often change over time. Then one can calculate the weighted av-
erage of the lieutenant wage, the captain wage and the retirement pension,
at each time point, where the weights are the probabilities of being a lieu-
tenant, a captain and retired. These weighted averages are integrated over
time, that is,
∫ τ1
τ0
{WageltPr(lt)+WagecapPr(cap)+PensionPr(rt)}dt. This
type of compensation calculation incorporating salary information is de-
scribed in Pan and Gastwirth (2013), in a simpler context where only point
estimates are given.
The time period over which the economic damages will be paid depends
on the specific facts of each case because compensation ends when the effect
of the discriminatory practices ceases and is determined by the court. If
seniority has a major role as in Alexander v. Milwaukee, the time when
the discrimination effect on a particular plaintiff ends may depend on the
promotions and retirements of more senior plaintiffs. Thus, for the purpose
of compensation, it is desirable for courts to require employers to provide
pay data beyond the period of discrimination used in the liability stage.
Although the problem addressed here arose in the context of a legal case,
predicting the durations before and after the event of interest in the presence
of a terminating event occurs in other applications. For example, when banks
merge, the value of the bank being taken over depends on the expected
durations of the existing accounts. Each account may remain at the same
level, be upgraded to a higher type or be closed. The latter two correspond
to the promotion and retirement in our motivating example. In the academic
job market, people are often interested in the length of time individuals spent
as a postdoc before obtaining a regular position. Some postdocs eventually
opt to take a job outside the subject of their doctoral degree, which is the
terminating event.
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Fig. 2. Possible scenarios for the promotion and retirement processes with hypothetical
P1i, P
∗
2i,R1i,R
∗
2i values.
APPENDIX
A.1. Plot of hypothetical scenarios of the promotion and retirement pro-
cesses. For the plot of hypothetical scenarios for the promotion and retire-
ment processes, see Figure 2.
A.2. Proofs of the theorems. Under conditions (a) to (f), the almost
sure convergence of β̂ to β0 and θ̂ to θ0 holds from the Empirical Cen-
tral Limit theorem [Pollard (1990)]. Furthermore, Λ̂P0 (t;β0)
a.s.
−→ ΛP0 (t) and
Λ̂R0 (t; θ0)
a.s.
−→ ΛR0 (t) for all t ∈ [τ0, τ1] [Andersen and Gill (1982)]. By the
continuous mapping theorem [Sen and Singer (1993)],∫ τ1
τ0
{1− ŜP (t|X˜i(t))}Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))dt
a.s.
−→E(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)).
To derive the variance, n1/2{ŜP (t|X˜i(t)) − S
P (t|X˜i(t))} is decomposed
into two parts:
n1/2{ŜP (t|X˜i(t))− S
P (t|X˜i(t))}
= n1/2{ŜP (t; β̂, dΛ̂P0 (t)|X˜i(t))− Ŝ
P (t;β0, dΛ̂
P
0 (t)|X˜i(t))}(8)
+ n1/2{ŜP (t;β0, dΛ̂
P
0 (t)|X˜i(t))− S
P (t|X˜i(t))}.
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Apply a Taylor expansion to the first term on the right side of (8) around
β0. As n→∞,
n1/2{ŜP (t; β̂, dΛ̂P0 (t)|X˜i(t))− Ŝ
P (t;β0, dΛ̂
P
0 (t)|X˜i(t))}
=
∂ŜP (t;β,dΛ̂P0 (t)|X˜i(t))
∂β′
∣∣∣
β=β∗
n1/2(β̂ − β0)(9)
=−ŜP (t;β∗, dΛ̂
P
0 (t)|X˜i(t))
×
∫ t
P1i
[eβ
′
∗X˜i(u){X˜i(u)−X(u;β∗)}dΛ̂
P
0 (u;β∗)]n
1/2(β̂ − β0),
where β∗ lies between β̂ and β0. Furthermore, another Taylor expansion of
the score function UP (β̂) around β0 yields
n1/2(β̂ − β0) = {A
P (β0)}
−1
n−1/2
n∑
i=1
UPi (β0),(10)
where UPi (β) =
∫ τ1
τ0
{Xi(t)−X(t;β)}dN
P
i (t). Combining (9) and (10) yields
n1/2{ŜP (t; β̂, dΛ̂P0 (t)|X˜i(t))− Ŝ
P (t;β0, dΛ̂
P
0 (t)|X˜i(t))}
(11)
= n−1/2
n∑
i=1
ξPi1(t),
where ξPi1(t) = −Ŝ
P (t|X˜i(t))
∫ t
P1i
[eβ
′
0X˜i(u){X˜i(u) − X(u;β0)}dΛ̂
P
0 (u;β0)] ×
{AP (β0)}
−1UPi (β0).
For the second term on the right side of (8), when n→∞,
n1/2{ŜP (t;β0, dΛ̂
P
0 (t)|X˜i(t))− S
P (t|X˜i(t))}
= n1/2
[
exp
{
−
∫ t
P1i
dΛ̂P0 (u;β0)e
β′0X˜i(u)
}
− exp
{
−
∫ t
P1i
dΛP0 (u)e
β′0X˜i(u)
}]
=−SP (t|X˜i(t))n
1/2
∫ t
P1i
eβ
′
0X˜i(u){dΛ̂P0 (u;β0)− dΛ
P
0 (u)},
while
n1/2{dΛ̂P0 (u;β0)− dΛ
P
0 (u)}
= n−1/2
{∑n
i=1 dN
P
i (u)
S
(0)
P (u;β0)
− dΛP0 (u)
}
= n−1/2
n∑
i=1
dMPi (u;β0)
S
(0)
P (u;β0)
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= n−1/2
n∑
i=1
dMPi (u;β0)
s
(0)
P (u;β0)
+ n−1/2
n∑
i=1
[S
(0)
P (u;β0)
−1 − s
(0)
P (u;β0)
−1]dMPi (u;β0),
where s
(0)
P (u;β) = limn→∞S
(0)
P (u;β) and dM
P
i (u;β) = dN
P
i (u) − Y
P
i (u) ×
eβ
′Xi(u) dΛP0 (u). The second term
n−1/2
n∑
i=1
[S
(0)
P (u;β0)
−1 − s
(0)
P (u;β0)
−1]dMPi (u;β0)
converges to zero, by the strong convergence of S(0)(r;β0) to s
(0)(r;β0), the
continuous mapping theorem and the uniform strong law of large numbers.
Therefore, as n→∞,
n1/2{dΛ̂P (t;β0)− dΛ(t)
P } ≈ n−1/2
n∑
i=1
dMPi (t;β0)
s
(0)
P (t;β0)
,
n1/2{ŜP (t;β0, dΛ̂
P
0 (t)|X˜i(t))− S
P (t|X˜i(t))}= n
−1/2
n∑
i=1
ξPi2(t),
where
ξPi2(t) =−S
P (t|X˜i(t))
∫ t
P1i
eβ
′
0X˜i(u)
dMPi (u;β0)
s
(0)
P (u;β0)
.
In summary, combining (11) and (12), when n→∞,
n1/2{ŜP (t|X˜i(t))− S
P (t|X˜i(t))}= n
−1/2
n∑
i=1
{ξPi1(t) + ξ
P
i2(t)}.(12)
Similarly,
n1/2{ŜR(t|Z˜i(t))− S
R(t|Z˜i(t))}= n
−1/2
n∑
i=1
{ξRi1(t) + ξ
R
i2(t)},(13)
where
ξRi1(t) =−Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))
×
∫ t
R1i
[eθ
′
0Z˜i(u){Z˜i(u)−Z(u; θ0)}dΛ̂
R
0 (u; θ0)]A
R(θ0)
−1
URi (θ0)
ξRi2(t) =−S
R(t|Z˜i(t))
∫ t
R1i
eθ
′
0Z˜i(u)
dMRi (u; θ0)
s
(0)
R (u; θ0)
.
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Combining (12) and (13), we get
n1/2{(1− ŜP (t|X˜i(t)))Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))− (1− S
P (t|X˜i(t)))S
R(t|Z˜i(t))}
= n1/2{(1− ŜP (t|X˜i(t)))Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))− (1− S
P (t|X˜i(t)))Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))}
+ n1/2{(1− SP (t|X˜i(t)))Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))− (1− S
P (t|X˜i(t)))S
R(t|Z˜i(t))}
= n−1/2
n∑
i=1
[ŜR{t|Z˜i(t)}{−ξ
P
i1(t)− ξ
P
i2(t)}
+ {1− SP (t|X˜i(t))}{ξ
R
i1(t) + ξ
R
i2(t)}].
Integrating over [τ0, τ1],
n1/2{Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))−E(T
cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))}= n
−1/2
n∑
i=1
∫ τ1
τ0
ξi(t)dt,
where
ξi(t) = {Ŝ
R(t|Z˜i(t))(−ξ
P
i1(t)− ξ
P
i2(t)) + (1− S
P (t|X˜i(t)))(ξ
R
i1(t) + ξ
R
i2(t))}.
By the empirical process theory [Pollard (1990); Van der Vaart and Wellner
(1996)], n1/2{Ê(T cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))− E(T
cap|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t))} converges weakly
to a mean-zero Gaussian process with variance E[{
∫ τ1
τ0
ξi(t)dt}
2], which
can be estimated by replacing parameters with their empirical estimates
and expectations with sample averages. The asymptotic distributions of
Ê(T lt|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) and Ê(T
rt|X˜i(t), Z˜i(t)) can be derived similarly.
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